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Abstract
In this work, we propose information laundering, a novel framework for enhancing model privacy. Unlike data
privacy that concerns the protection of raw data information, model privacy aims to protect an already-learned
model that is to be deployed for public use. The private model can be obtained from general learning methods, and
its deployment means that it will return a deterministic or random response for a given input query. An information-
laundered model consists of probabilistic components that deliberately maneuver the intended input and output for
queries to the model, so the model’s adversarial acquisition is less likely. Under the proposed framework, we
develop an information-theoretic principle to quantify the fundamental tradeoffs between model utility and privacy
leakage and derive the optimal design.
I. INTRODUCTION
An emerging number of applications involve the following user-scenario. Alice developed a model that
takes a specific query as input and calculates a response as output. The model is a stochastic black-box
that may represent a novel type of ensemble models, a known deep neural network architecture with
sophisticated parameter tuning, or a physical law described by stochastic differential equations. Bob is
a user that sends a query to Alice and obtains the corresponding response for his specific purposes,
whether benign or adversarial. Examples of the above scenario include many recent Machine-Learning-
as-a-Service (MLaaS) services [1]–[3] and artificial intelligence chips, where Alice represents a learning
service provider, and Bob represents users.
The work was supported by the Army Research Office (ARO) under grant number W911NF-20-1-0222.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of (a) Alice’s effective system for public use, and (b) Alice’s idealistic system not for public use. In the figure, K∗
denotes the already-learned model/API, K1 denotes the kernel that perturbs the input data query by potential adversaries, and K2 denotes
the kernel that perturbs the output response from K∗ to publish the final response Y .
Suppose that Bob obtains sufficient paired input-output data as generated from Alice’s black-box model,
it is conceivable that Bob could treat it as supervised data and reconstruct Alice’s model to some extent.
From the view of Alice, her model may be treated as valuable and private. As Bob that queries the model
may be benign or adversarial, Alice may intend to offer limited utility for the return of enhanced privacy.
The above concern naturally motivates the following problem.
(Q1) How to enhance the privacy for an already-learned model? Note that the above problem is not
about data privacy, where the typical goal is to prevent adversarial inference of the data information during
data transmission or model training. In contrast, model privacy concerns an already-established model.
We propose to study a general approach to jointly maneuver the original query’s input and output so
that Bob finds it challenging to guess Alice’s core model. As illustrated in Figure 1a, Alice’s model is
treated as a transition kernel (or communication channel) that produces Y˜ conditional on any given X˜ .
Compared with an honest service Alice would have provided (Figure 1b), the input X˜ is a maneuvered
version of Bob’s original input X; Moreover, Alice may choose to return a perturbed outcome Y instead
of Y˜ to Bob. Consequently, the apparent kernel from Bob’s input query X to the output response Y is a
cascade of three kernels, denoted by K in Figure 1a. The above perspective provides a natural and general
framework to study model privacy. Admittedly, if Alice produces a (nearly) random response, adversaries
will find it difficult to steal the model, while benign users will find it useless. Consequently, we raise
another problem.
(Q2) How to formulate the model privacy-utility tradeoff, and what is the optimal way of imposing
privacy? To address this question, we formulate a model privacy framework from an information-theoretic
perspective, named information laundering. We briefly describe the idea below. The general goal is to
jointly design the input and output kernels (K1 and K2 in Figure 1a) that deliberately maneuver the
intended input and output for queries to the model so that 1) the effective kernel (K in Figure 1a) for
Bob is not too far away from the original kernel (K∗ in Figure 1a), and 2) adversarial acquisition of the
model becomes difficult. Alternatively, Alice ‘launders’ the input-output information maximally given a
3fixed utility loss. To find the optimal way of information laundering, we propose an objective function
that involves two components: the first being the information shared between X, X˜ and between Y˜ , Y ,
and the second being the average Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the conditional distribution
describing K and K∗. Intuitively, the first component controls the difficulty of guessing K∗ sandwiched
between two artificial kernels K1 and K2, while the second component ensures that overall utility is
maximized under the same privacy constraints. By optimizing the objective for varying weights between
the components, we can quantify the fundamental tradeoffs between model utility and privacy.
A. Related Work
We introduce some closely related literature below. Section III-C will incorporate more technical
discussions on some related but different frameworks, including information bottleneck, local data privacy,
information privacy, and adversarial model attack.
A closely related subject of study is data privacy, which has received extensive attention in recent years
due to societal concerns [4]–[8]. Data privacy concerns the protection of (usually personal) data information
from different perspectives, including lossless cryptography [9], [10], randomized data collection [11], [12],
statistical database query [13], [14]. A common goal in data privacy is to obfuscate individual-level data
values while still enabling population-wide learning. In contrast, the subject of model privacy focuses on
protecting a single learned model ready to deploy. For example, we want to privatize a classifier to deploy
on the cloud for public use, whether the model is previously trained from raw image data or a data-private
procedure.
Another closely related subject is model extraction proposed in [15], where Bob’s goal is to reconstruct
Alice’s model from several queries’ inputs and outputs, knowing what specific model Alice uses. For
example, suppose that Alice’s model is a generalized linear regression with p features. In that case, it is
likely to be reconstructed using p queries of the expected mean (a known function of Xβ) by solving
equations [15]. In the supervised learning scenario, when only labels are returned to any given input,
model extraction could be cast as an active learning problem where the goal is to query most efficiently
[16]. Despite existing work from model reconstruction perspective, principled methods and theories to
enhance model privacy remain an open problem.
B. Contributions and Outline
The main contributions of this work are three folds. First, we develop a novel concept, theory, and
method, generally referred to as information laundering, to study model privacy. Unlike data privacy
that concerns the protection of raw data information, model privacy aims to privatize an already-learned
4model for public use. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, we present the first framework to study model
privacy in a principled manner. Second, under the developed information-theoretic framework, we cast
the tradeoffs between model privacy and utility as a general optimization problem. We derive the optimal
solution using the calculus of variations and provide extensive discussions on the solution’s insights from
different angles. Third, we develop a concrete algorithm, prove its convergence, and elaborate on some
specific cases.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the problem formulation and a general
approach to protect the model. In Section III, we propose the information laundering method that casts the
model privacy-utility tradeoff as an optimization problem and derives a general solution. In Section III-C,
we provide some additional discussions of the related frameworks, including information bottleneck, local
data privacy, information privacy, and adversarial model attack. In Section V, we conclude the paper with
some potential future work. In the Appendix, we provide the proofs of the main results and experimental
studies.
II. FORMULATION
A. Background
The private model can be obtained from general learning methods, and its deployment means that it
will return a response for a given input query. Suppose that X and Y are the input and output alphabets
(data space), respectively.
Definition 1 (Learned model): A learned model is a kernel p : X × Y → [0, 1], which induces a class
of conditional distributions {p(· | x) : x ∈ X}.
A model in the above definition is also referred to as a communication channel in information theory. A
model can be regarded as the input-output (or Alice’s application programming interface, API) offered to
Bob. Examples include a regression/classification model that outputs predicted labels, a clustering model
that outputs the probabilities of belonging to specific groups, and a stochastic differential equation system
that outputs the likely paths for various inputs variables. It does not matter where the model comes from
since we are only concerned about the privacy of a fixed given model. The (authentic) model of Alice is
denoted by pK∗ .
What is model privacy? Our perspective is that privacy is not an intrinsic quantity associated with a
model; instead, it is a measure of information that arises from interactions between the model and its
queries. In our context, the interactions are through X (offered by Bob) and Y (offered by Alice). The
key idea of enhancing Alice’s model privacy is to let Alice output noisy predictions Y˜ for any input X so
that Bob cannot easily infer Alice’s original model. Similarly, Alice may choose to manipulate X as well
5before passing it through K∗. Alternatively, Alice intends to 1) impose some ambiguity between X, X˜ ,
and between Y, Y˜ , which conceivably will produce response deviating from the original one, and 2) seek
the K closest to K∗ under the same amount of ambiguity imposed. Motivated by the above concepts, we
introduce the following notion. The information-laundered model of Alice is denoted by pK .
Definition 2 (Information-laundered model): A information-laundered model with respect to a given
model K∗ is a model K that consists of three internal kernels K = K1 ◦K∗ ◦K2 (illustrated in Figure 1).
B. Notation
We let pK∗(· | ·), pK1(· | ·), pK2(· | ·), pK(· | ·) denote the kernels that represent the authentic model,
input kernel, output kernel, and the information-laundered model, respectively. We let pX(·) denote the
marginal distribution of X . Similar notation is for pX˜(·), pY˜ (·), and pY (·). Note that the pY implicitly
depends on the above conditional distributions. We use pK1◦K∗(· | ·) and pK∗◦K2(· | ·) to denote cascade
conditional distributions of Y˜ | X and Y | X˜ , respectively.
Throughout the paper, random variables are denoted by capital letters. Suppose that X ∈ X , X˜ ∈ X˜ ,
Y˜ ∈ Y˜ , and Y ∈ Y . For technical convenience, we will assume that X , X˜ , Y˜Y are finite alphabets unless
otherwise stated. We will discuss some special cases when some of them are the same. Our theoretical
results apply to continuous alphabets as well under suitable conditions. For notational convenience, we
write the sum
∑
x∈X˜ u(x) as
∑
x u(x) for any function u.
With a slight abuse of notation, we will use p to denote a distribution, density function, or transition
kernel, depending on the context.
III. INFORMATION LAUNDERING
A. The Information Laundering Principle
The information laundering method is an optimization problem formulated from the concept of KL-
divergence between the (designed) effective kernel and the original kernel, with constraints of the privacy
leakage during the model-data interaction. In particular, we propose to minimize the following objective
function over (pK1 , pK2),
L(pK1 , pK2)
∆
= EX∼pxDKL(pK∗(· | X), pK(· | X)) + β1I(X; X˜) + β2I(Y ; Y˜ ). (1)
In the above, K1 and K2 are implicitly involved in each additive term of L, and β1 ≥ 0, β2 ≥ 0 are
constants that determine the utility-privacy tradeoffs. Small values of β1 and β2 (e.g., zeros) pushes the
K to be the same as K∗, while large values of β1 pushes X˜ to be nearly-independent with X (similarly
for β2). It is worth mentioning that the principle presumes a given alphabet (or representation) for X˜ and
Y˜ . The variables to optimize over is the transition laws X → X˜ and Y˜ → Y .
6The objective in (1) may be interpreted in the following way. On the one hand, Alice aims to develop
an effective system of K that resembles the authentic one K∗ for the utility of benign users. This goal is
realized through the first term in (1), which is the average divergence between two system dynamics. On
the other hand, Alice’s model privacy leakage is through interactions with Bob, which in turn is through
the input X (publicly offered by Bob) and output Y (publicly offered by Alice). Thus, we control the
information propagated through both the input-interfaces and out-interfaces, leading to the second and
third terms in (1).
We note that the above objective function may also be formulated in alternative ways from different
perspectives. For example, we may change the third term to be β2I(Y ; Y˜ | X, X˜), interpreted in the way
that Alice will design K1 first, and then design K2 conditional on K1. Likewise, we may change the
second term to be β1I(X; X˜ | Y˜ , Y ), meaning that K2 is designed first. From Bob’s perspective, we may
also change the third term to β2I(Y ; Y˜ | X), interpreted for the scenario where Bob conditions on the
input information X during model extraction. Additionally, from the perspective of adaptive interactions
between Alice and Bob, we may consider pX as part of the optimization and solve the max-min problem
maxpX minpK1 ,pK2 L(pK1 , pK2). We leave these alternative views to future work.
B. The optimal solution
We derive the solution that corresponds to the optimal tradeoffs and point out some nice interpretations
of the results. The derivation is nontrivial as the functional involves several nonlinear terms of the variables
to optimize over. Note that for the notation defined in Subsection II-B, only pX and pK∗ are known and
others are (implicitly) determined by pK1 , pK2 .
Theorem 1: The optimal solution of (1) satisfies the following equations.
pK1(x˜ | x) = κxpX˜(x˜) exp
{
1
β1
EY |X=x∼pK∗
pK∗◦K2(Y | x˜)
pK(Y | x) −
β2
β1
EY˜ ,Y |X˜=x˜ log
pK2(Y | Y˜ )
pY (Y )
}
, (2)
pK2(y | y˜) = τy˜pY (y) exp
{
1
β2pY˜ (y˜)
EX∼pX
pK∗(y | X) · pK1◦K∗(y˜ | X)
pK(y | X)
}
, (3)
where κx and τy˜ are normalizing constants implicitly defined so that the conditional density function
integrates to one.
Note that the distributions of X˜ , Y˜ , Y , and Y˜ , Y | X˜ , implicitly depend on pK1 and pK2 . The above
theorem naturally leads to an iterative algorithm to estimate the unknown conditional distributions pK1
and pK2 . In particular, we may alternate Equations (2) and (3) to obtain p
(`)
K1
(x˜ | x), p(`)K2(y | y˜) from
p
(`−1)
K1
(x˜ | x), p(`−1)K2 (y | y˜) at step ` = 1, 2, . . . with random initial values at ` = 0. The pseudocode is
summarized in Algorithm 1.
In the next theorem, we show that the convergence of the algorithm. The sketch of the proof is
described below. First, we treat the original objective L as another functional J of four independent
7Algorithm 1 Optimized Information Laundering (OIL)
input Input distribution pX , private model pK∗ , alphabets X , X˜ , Y˜,Y for X, X˜, Y˜ , Y , respectively.
output Transition kernels pK1 and pK2
1: Let p(0)
X˜
and p(0)Y denote the uniform distribution on X˜ and Y , respectively.
2: for t = 0→ T − 1 do
3: Calculate
p
(t+1)
K1
(x˜ | x) = κxp(t)X˜ (x˜) exp
{
1
β1
EY |x∼pK∗
p
(t)
K∗◦K2(Y | x˜)
p
(t)
K (Y | x)
− β2
β1
E
Y˜ ,Y |x˜∼p(t)K∗◦K2
log
p
(t)
K2
(Y | Y˜ )
p
(t)
Y (Y )
}
,
p
(t+1)
K2
(y | y˜) = τy˜p(t)Y (y) exp
{
1
β2p
(t)
Y˜
(y˜)
EX∼pX
pK∗(y | X) · p(t+1)K1◦K∗(y˜ | X)
p
(t+1,t)
K (y | X)
}
,
p
(t+1)
X˜
(x˜) =
∑
x
p
(t+1)
K1
(x˜ | x)pX(x),
p
(t+1)
Y (y) =
∑
y˜
p
(t+1)
K2
(y | y˜)p(t+1)
Y˜
(y˜),
where p(t+1)K1◦K∗ , p
(t)
K∗◦K2 , and p
(t+1,t)
K denote the kernels cascaded from (p
(t+1)
K1
, pK∗), (pK∗ , p
(t)
K2
), and (p(t+1)K1 , pK∗ , p
(t)
K2
),
respectively, and p(t+1)
Y˜
is the marginal from (p(t+1)
X˜
, pK∗ , p
(t+1)
K2
).
4: end for
5: Return pK1 = p
(T )
K1
, pK2 = p
(T )
K2
.
variables, pK1 , pK2 , h1, h2, evaluated at h1 = pX˜ and h2 = pY . Using a technique historically used to prove
the convergence of the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm for calculating rate-distortion functions in information
theory, we show that J ≥ L. We also show that L is convex in each variable so that the objective function
is non-increasing in each alternation between four equations. Since L ≥ 0, the convergence is implied by
the monotone convergence theorem.
Theorem 2: Algorithm 1 converges to a minimum that satisfies equations (2) and (3).
Note that the minimum is possibly a local minimum. We will later show the convergence to a global
minimum in a particular case. Next, we provide interpretations of the parameters and how they affect the
final solution.
A large β1 in the optimization of (1) indicates a higher weight on the term I(X; X˜). In the extreme
case when β1 = ∞, minimizing I(X; X˜) is attained when X˜ is independent with X . Consequently, the
effective model of Alice produces a fixed distribution of responses for whatever Bob queries. The above
observation is in line with the derived equation (2), which will become pK1(x˜ | x) ≈ κxpX˜(x˜) (and thus
κx ≈ 1) for a large β1 > 0.
Similar to the effect of β1, a larger β2 imposes more independence between Y˜ and Y . In the case
β2 =∞, Alice may pass the input to her internal model K∗ but output random results. This can be seen
8from either the Formulation (1) or Equation (3).
For the first expectation in equation (2), the term may be interpreted as the average likelihood ratio of
y conditional on x˜ against x. From Equation (2), it is more likely to transit from x to x˜ in the presence of
a larger likelihood ratio. This result is intuitively appealing because a large likelihood ratio indicates that
x may be replaced with x˜ without harming the overall likelihood of observing Y . Intuitive explanations
to other terms could be similarly made.
C. Further Discussions on Related Work
Information Bottleneck: extracting instead of privatizing information. The information bottleneck
method [17] is an information-theoretic approach that aims to find a parsimonious representation of raw
data X , denoted by X˜ , that contains the maximal information of a variable Y of interest. The method
has been applied to various learning problems such as clustering, dimension reduction, and theoretical
interpretations for deep neural networks [18]. Formally, the information bottleneck method assumes the
Markov chain
X˜ → X → Y, (4)
and seeks the the optimal transition law from X to X˜ by minimizing the functional
L(pX˜|X) = I(X; X˜)− βI(X˜;Y ),
with β being is a tuning parameter that controls the tradeoffs between compression rate (the first term) and
amount of meaningful information (second term). The alphabet of the above X˜ needs to be pre-selected
and often much smaller in size compared to the alphabet of X to meet the purpose of compression. In
other words, the information that X provides about Y is passed through a ‘bottleneck’ formed by the
parsimonious alphabet of X˜ .
A similarity between the information bottleneck method and the particular case of information launder-
ing in Subsection B is that they both optimize a functional of the transition law of X → X˜ . Nevertheless,
their objective and formulation are fundamentally different. First, the objective of information bottleneck
is to compress the representation while preserving meaningful information, under the assumption of (4);
Our goal is to distort X while minimizing the gap between the (random) functionality of X → Y , under
a different Markov chain X → X˜ → Y .
Data Privacy and Information Privacy: protecting data instead of a model. The tradeoffs between
individual-level data privacy and population-level learning utility have motivated active research on what
is generally referred to as ‘local data privacy’ across multiple fields such as data mining [11], security [12],
statistics [19], and information theory [20], [21]. For example, a popular framework is the local differential
9privacy [11], [12], [22], where raw data X is suitably randomized (often by adding Laplace noises) into
Y so that the ratio of conditional densities
e−α ≤ pY |X(y | x1)
pY |X(y | x2) ≤ e
α (5)
for any y, x1, x2 ∈ X , where α > 0 is a pre-determined value that quantities the level of privacy. In the
above, X and Y represent the private data and the processed data to be collected or publicly distributed. The
requirement (5) guarantees that the KL-divergence between pY |x1 and pY |x2 is universally upper-bounded
by a known function of α (see, e.g., [19]), meaning that x1 and x2 are barely distinguishable from the
observed y. Note that the above comparison is made between two conditional distributions, while the
comparison in information laundering (recall the first term in (1)) is made between two transition kernels.
The local differential privacy framework does not need to specify a probability space for X , since
the notion of data privacy is only built on conditional distributions. Another related framework is the
information privacy [20], which assumes a probabilistic structure on X and a Markov chain X → Y˜ → Y .
In the above chain, X is the private raw data, Y˜ is a set of measurement points to transmit or publicize,
and Y is a distortion of Y˜ that is eventually collected or publicized. We deliberately chose the above
notation of X, Y˜ , Y , so that the Markov chain appears similar to the special case of information laundering
in Subsection IV. Nevertheless, the objective of information privacy is to minimize I(X;Y ) over pY |Y˜
subject to utility constraints, assuming that the joint distribution of X, Y˜ is known. In other words, the
goal is to maximally hide the information of X . In the context of information laundering, the system
input X is provided by users and is known.
Adversarial Model Attack: rendering harm instead of utility to a model. The adversarial model
attack literature concerns the adversarial use of specially crafted input data to cause a machine learning
model, often a deep neural network, to malfunction [23]–[25]. For example, an adversarial may inject
noise into an image so that a well-trained classifier produces an unexpected output, even if the noise is
perceptually close to the original one. A standard attack is the so-called (Adaptive) Black-Box Attack
against classifiers hosted by a model owner, e.g., Amazon and Google [26], [27]. For a target model
K∗, a black-box adversary has no information about the training process of K∗ but can access the target
model through query-response interfaces. The adversary issues (adaptive) queries and record the returned
labels to train a local surrogate model. The surrogate model is then used to craft adversarial samples to
maximize the target model’s prediction error.
If we let X, X˜, Y denote the model input, adversarially perturbed input, and output, respectively, then we
may draw a similarity between adversarial model attack and the particular case of information laundering
in Subsection B since they both look for the law X → X˜ . The main difference is in the objective. While
the model attack aims to find an input domain that maximally distorts the model, information laundering
10
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Fig. 2. Illustration of Alice’s information-laundered system for public use, by (a) alternating input only, and (b) alternating output only. The
notations are similar to those in Figure 1.
aims to maintain a small model discrepancy. Under our notation, a possible formulation for the model
attack is to seek maxpX˜|X EX∼pXDKL(pK∗(· | X), pK∗(· | X˜)) under a constraint of pX˜|X .
IV. SPECIAL CASE: INFORMATION LAUNDERING OF THE OUTPUT (Y ) ONLY
Two special cases of an information-laundered system are illustrated in Figure 2. Here, we elaborate
on one case and include the other special case in the Appendix. Suppose that K1 is an identity map and
let β1 = 0. In other words, we alter the output data only (Figure 2b). Then the optimization problem (1)
reduces to minimizing
L(pK2)
∆
= EX∼pxDKL(pK∗(· | X), pK(· | X)) + β2I(Y ; Y˜ ). (6)
Corollary 1: The solution to the optimization problem (6) satisfies
pK2(y | y˜) = τy˜pY (y) exp
{
1
β2pY˜ (y˜)
EX∼pX
pK∗(y | X) · pK∗(y˜ | X)
pK(y | X)
}
, (7)
where τy˜ is a normalizing constant. In particular, if K∗ is deterministic, equation (7) becomes
pK2(y | y˜) = τy˜pY (y) exp
{
1
β2pY˜ (y˜)
∑
x:f(x)=y
pX(x)
1y=y˜
pK(y | x)
}
= τy˜pY (y) exp
{
1y=y˜
β2 pK2(y | y)
}
(8)
To exemplify the proposed methodology, we study a specific case with the following conditions.
1) X may be large or continuously-valued, Y˜ = Y is a moderately-large alphabet,
2) Y˜ = Y so that Y˜ and Y are in the same space,
3) K∗ is deterministic.
Under the above scenario, we can apply Algorithm 1 and Corollary 1 to obtain a simplified procedure
below (denoted by OIL-Y). At each time step t = 1, 2, . . . ,, for each y˜, y ∈ Y , we calculate
p
(t+1)
K2
(y | y˜) = τy˜p(t)Y (y) exp
{
1y=y˜
β2 p
(t)
K2
(y | y)
}
, where τ−1y˜ =
∑
y
p
(t)
Y (y) exp
{
1y=y˜
β2 p
(t)
K2
(y | y)
}
,
p
(t+1)
Y (y) = ry˜p
(t+1)
K2
(y | y˜), where ry˜ =
∑
x:f(x)=y˜
pX(x). (9)
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Note that the above ry˜ is the probability that Alice observes y˜ as an output of K∗∗ if Bob inputs X ∈ pX .
Therefore, ry˜ can be easily estimated to be the empirical frequency of observing y˜ at the end of Alice.
Note that since Y is a finite alphabet, we can use a matrix representation for easy implementation. In
particular, we represent the elements of Y by 1, . . . , a, where a = card(Y). We then represent pK2 by
P ∈ Ra×a, and pY by q ∈ Ra, where Py,y˜ = pK2(y | y˜). Such a representation will lead to a matrix form
of the above procedure, summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 OIL-Y (a special case of Algorithm 1, in the matrix form)
input Input distribution pX , private model pK∗
output Transition kernels pK2 : Y × Y → [0, 1] represented by P ∈ Ra×a, where a = card(Y)
1: Estimate r = [r1, . . . , ra] from pX and pK∗ as in equation (9)
2: Initialize the entries of P (0) and q(0) (respectively representing pK2 , pY ) to be 1/a
3: for t = 0→ T − 1 do
4: Calculate P (t+1) = q(t) × 1T , diag(P ), where 1 = [1, . . . , 1] denote the a× 1 vector.
5: Update diag(P (t+1))← diag(P (t+1)) · exp{1/(β2 diag(P (t))}, where the operations are element-wise
6: Scale each column (conditional distribution) of P (t+1) so that it sums to one
7: Calculate q(t+1) = P (t+1) × r
8: end for
9: Return p(T )K2 that is represented by P
(T ).
Moreover, we proved the convergence to the global minimum for the alternating equations in the above
scenario. The same technique can be emulated to show a similar result when we employ K1 (instead of
K2) only. The result is summarized in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3: Suppose that K∗ is deterministic. The alternating equation (9), or its matrix form in
Algorithm 1, converges to a global minimum of the problem (6).
V. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER REMARKS
Despite extensive studies on data privacy, little has been studied for enhancing model privacy. Motivated
by the emerging concern of model privacy from the perspective of machine learning service providers,
we develop a novel methodology to enhance the privacy of any given model of interest. We believe that
the developed principles, theories, and insights can lead to new resilient machine learning algorithms
and services. Interesting future work includes application studies on a case-by-case basis that are built
upon the developed principle. Theoretically, there are three open problems left from the work that
deserves further research. First, how does the imposed constraint of mutual information affect the rate of
convergence from the adversary perspective for specific models (e.g., generalized linear models, decision
trees, neural networks)? Second, we assumed finite alphabets for technical convenience. How to emulate
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our current technical machinery to analyze continuously-valued alphabets? Third, what would be the
relative importance of laundering X versus Y , and will this depend on specific learning problems?
Appendix. In Appendices A and B, we first include two particular cases of information laundering
that were not included in the main part of the paper. We then include the proofs of the theorems in
Appendix C. Experimental results are included in Appendices D, E, and F to demonstrate the algorithm
convergence, model privacy-utility tradeoffs, and how tradeoff parameters and unbalanced samples may
influence the optimized information laundering.
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APPENDIX
A. Special cases: deterministic model K∗
Suppose that for each given x˜, the conditional distribution pK(· | x˜) assigns all the mass at y˜. In
other words, K∗ reduces to a deterministic function mapping each x˜ ∈ X to a unique y˜ ∈ Y , which
is denoted by y˜ = f(x˜). For example, Alice’s model is a classifier that takes input features and returns
hard-thresholded classification labels. In this case, Theorem 1 implies the following corollary. We will
use this result in later sections.
Corollary 2: The optimal solution of (1) satisfies the following equations.
pK1(x˜ | x) = κxpX˜(x˜) exp
{
1
β1
pK2(f(x) | f(x˜))∑
x˜′ pK2(f(x) | f(x˜′))pK1(x˜′ | x)
− β2
β1
EY |Y˜=f(x˜) log
pK2(Y | f(x˜))
pY (Y )
}
,
pK2(y | y˜) = τy˜pY (y) exp
{
1
β2pY˜ (y˜)
∑
x:f(x)=y
pX(x)
pK1◦K∗(y˜ | x)
pK(y | x)
}
,
where κx and τy˜ are normalizing constants implicitly defined so that the conditional density function
integrates to one.
B. Information laundering of the input (X) only
Suppose that K2 is an identity map and let β2 = 0 so that we only maneuver the input data (Figure 2a).
Then the optimization problem (1) reduces to minimizing
L(pK1)
∆
= EX∼pxDKL(pK∗(· | X), pK(· | X)) + β1I(X; X˜). (10)
Corollary 3: The optimal solution of (10) satisfies the following equations.
pK1(x˜ | x) = κxpX˜(x˜) exp
{
1
β1
EY |X=x∼pK∗
pK∗(Y | X˜ = x˜)
pK(Y | X = x)
}
, (11)
where κx is an implicitly defined normalizing constant. In particular, if K∗ is deterministic, equation (11)
becomes
pK1(x˜ | x) = κxpX˜(x˜) exp
{
1f(x)=f(x˜)
β1
∑
x˜′:f(x)=f(x˜′) pK1(x˜
′ | x)
}
. (12)
As we can see from Corollaries 1 and 3, for a deterministic K∗ (represented by f ), the simplified
equation of (8) is similar to that of (12). The subtle difference that one has a sum while the other does
not is because f may not be a one-to-one mapping.
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C. Proofs
Proof 1 (Proof of Theorem 1): Introducing Lagrange multipliers, λ1(x) for the normalization of the
conditional distributions pK1(· | x) at each x, λ2(y˜) for the normalization of the conditional distributions
pK2(· | y˜) at each y˜. The Lagrangian of (1) can be written as
L = −
∑
x,y
pX(x)pK∗(y | x) log pK(y | x) + β1
∑
x,x˜
pX(x)pK1(x˜ | x) log
pK1(x˜ | x)
pX˜(x˜)
+ β2
∑
y˜,y
pY˜ (y˜)pK2(y | y˜) log
pK2(y | y˜)
pY (y)
+
∑
x
λ1(x)pK1(x˜ | x) +
∑
y˜
λ2(y˜)pK2(y | y˜) + c
= A1 + A2 + A3 + A4 + A5 + c (13)
up to an additive constant c that is determined by the known pX and pK∗ .
It can be verified that
∂pK(y | x)
pK1(x˜ | x)
= pK∗◦K2(y | x˜) (14)
∂pX˜(x˜)
pK1(x˜ | x)
= pX(x) (15)
∂pY˜ (y˜)
pK1(x˜ | x)
= pX(x)pK∗(y˜ | x˜) (16)
∂pY (y)
pK1(x˜ | x)
= pX(x)pK∗◦K2(y | x˜). (17)
Using (14)-(17), for a given x and x˜, we calculate the derivatives of each term in (13) with respect to
pK1(x˜ | x) to be
∂A1
pK1(x˜ | x)
= −pX(x)
∑
y
pK∗(y | x)
pK∗◦K2(y | x˜)
pK(y | x) (18)
∂A2
pK1(x˜ | x)
= β1pX(x) log
pK1(x˜ | x)
pX˜(x˜)
(19)
∂A3
pK1(x˜ | x)
= β2pX(x)
∑
y˜,y
pK∗◦K2(y˜, y | X˜ = x˜) log
pK2(y | y˜)
pY (y)
− β2pX(x)
∑
y˜,y
pY˜ (y˜)pK2(y | y˜)
pK∗◦K2(y | x˜)
pY (y)
= β2pX(x)
∑
y˜,y
pK∗◦K2(y˜, y | X˜ = x˜) log
pK2(y | y˜)
pY (y)
− β2pX(x) (20)
∂A4
pK1(x˜ | x)
= λ1(x) (21)
∂A5
pK1(x˜ | x)
= 0 (22)
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Taking equations (18)-(22) into (13), we obtain the first-order equation
∂L
∂pK1(x˜ | x)
= pX(x)
{
−EY |X=x∼pK∗
pK∗◦K2(Y | X˜ = x˜)
pK(Y | X = x) + β1 log
pK1(x˜ | x)
pX˜(x˜)
+ β2EY˜ ,Y |X˜=x˜ log
pK2(Y | Y˜ )
pY (Y )
+ λ˜1(x)
}
= 0, (23)
where λ˜(x) = λ1(x)/pX(x)− β2. Rearranging the terms in Equation (23), we obtain
log
pK1(x˜ | x)
pX˜(x˜)
=
1
β1
{
−λ˜1(x) + EY |X=x∼pK∗
pK∗◦K2(Y | X˜ = x˜)
pK(Y | X = x) − β2EY˜ ,Y |X˜=x˜ log
pK2(Y | Y˜ )
pY (Y )
}
which implies Equation (2).
Similarly, taking derivatives with respect to pK2(y | y˜) for given y˜ and y, it can be verified that
∂pK(y | x)
∂pK2(y | y˜)
= pK1◦K∗(y˜ | x)
∂L
∂pK2(y | y˜)
= −
∑
x
pX(x)pK∗(y | x)
pK1◦K∗(y˜ | x)
pK(y | x) + β2pY˜ (y˜) log
pK2(y | y˜)
pY (y)
+ λ2(y˜)
= −EX∼pX
pK∗(y | X) · pK1◦K∗(y˜ | X)
pK(y | X) + β2pY˜ (y˜) log
pK2(y | y˜)
pY (y)
+ λ2(y˜). (24)
Letting Equation (24) be zero and rearranging it, we obtain Equation (3).
Proof 2 (Proof of Theorem 2):
We define the following functional of four variables: pK1 , pK2 , h1, h2,
J(pK1 , pK2 , h1, h2) = −
∑
x,y
pX(x)pK∗(y | x) log pK(y | x) + β1
∑
x,x˜
pX(x)pK1(x˜ | x) log
pK1(x˜ | x)
h1(x˜)
+ β2
∑
y˜,y
pY˜ (y˜)pK2(y | y˜) log
pK2(y | y˜)
h2(y)
. (25)
We will use the following known result [28, Lemma 10.8.1]. Suppose that X and Y have a joint
distribution with density pXY , and the marginal densities are pX , pY , respectively. Then a density function
rY of y that minimizes the KL-divergence D(pXY , pXrY ) is the marginal distribution pY . This result
implies that minimizing the objective function in (1) can be written as a quadruple minimization
min
pK1 ,pK2 ,h1,h2
J(pK1 , pK2 , h1, h2). (26)
17
It can be verified from (23) and its preceding identities that
∂2J
∂pK1(x˜ | x)2
= pX(x)EY |X=x∼pK∗
pK∗◦K2(Y | x˜)
pK(Y | x)2
∂pK(Y | x)
∂pK1(x˜ | x)
+ β1
pX(x)
pK1(x˜ | x)
= pX(x)EY |X=x∼pK∗
pK∗◦K2(Y | x˜)2
pK(Y | x)2 + β1
pX(x)
pK1(x˜ | x)
(27)
∂2J
∂pK2(y | y˜)2
= EX∼pX
pK∗(y | X) · pK1◦K∗(y˜ | X)
pK(y | X)2
∂pK(y | X)
∂pK2(y | y˜)
+ β2
pY˜ (y˜)
pK2(y | y˜)
(28)
= EX∼pX
pK∗(y | X) · pK1◦K∗(y˜ | X)2
pK(y | X)2 + β2
pY˜ (y˜)
pK2(y | y˜)
(29)
∂2J
∂h1(x˜)2
= β1
∑
x
pX(x)pK1(x˜ | x)
h1(x˜)2
(30)
∂2J
∂h2(y)2
= β2
∑
y˜
pY˜ (y˜)pK2(y | y˜)
h2(y)2
(31)
Thus, J(pK1 , pK2 , h1, h2) is convex in each of the variables.
We begin with a choice of initial pK2 , h1, h2, and calculate the pK1 that minimizes the objective. Using
the method of Lagrange multipliers for this minimization (in a way similar to (13)), we obtain the solution
of pK1 shown in the first equation of Line 3, Algorithm 1. Similarly, we obtain the second equation in
Algorithm 1. For the conditional distributions pK1 and pK2 , we then calculate the marginal distributions
h1 (of x˜) that minimizes (25). Note that the terms of (25) involving h1 may be rewritten as
β1
∑
x,x˜
p(x, x˜) log
p(x, x˜)
p(x)h1(x˜)
which, by the aforementioned lemma, is minimized by the third equation of Line 3, Algorithm 1.
Similar arguments apply for h2. Consequently, each iteration step in Algorithm 1 reduces J . By the non-
negativeness of KL-divergence, J + c ≥ L ≥ 0, where L is in (1) and c is introduced in (13). Therefore,
J has a lower bound, and the algorithm will converge to a minimum. Note that J(pK1 , pK2 , h1, h2) is
convex in each of the variables independently but not in the variables’ product space. The current proof
does not imply the convergence to a global minimum.
Proof 3 (Proof of Theorem 3): Similar to the technique used in the above proof of Theorem 2, we cast
the optimization problem in (6) as a double minimization
min
pK2 ,h2
J(pK2 , h2)
∆
= −
∑
x,y
pX(x)pK∗(y | x) log pK(y | x) + β2
∑
y˜,y
pY˜ (y˜)pK2(y | y˜) log
pK2(y | y˜)
h2(y)
.
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We only need to check that J is strongly convex in its arguments. Direct calculations show that
∂2J
∂pK2(y | y˜)2
=
∑
x
pX(x)pK∗(y | x)
p2K∗(y˜ | x)
p2K(y | x)
+ β2
pY˜ (y˜)
pK2(y | y˜)
=
∑
x:f(x)=y,y=y˜
pX(x)
1
p2K(y | x)
+ β2
pY˜ (y˜)
pK2(y | y˜)
=
pY˜ (y˜)
p2K2(y | y˜)
1y=y˜ + β2
pY˜ (y˜)
pK2(y | y˜)
∂2J
∂h2(y)2
= β2
pY (y)
h2(y)2
∂2L
∂pK2(y | y˜)∂h2(y)
= −β2pY˜ (y˜)
h2(y)
.
The above equations indicate that the determinant of the Hessian satisfies
∂2J
∂pK2(y | y˜)2
· ∂
2J
∂h2(y)2
−
{
∂2L
∂pK2(y | y˜)∂h2(y)
}2
= β2
pY˜ (y˜)pY (y)
pK2(y | y˜)h2(y)2
1y=y˜ + β
2
2
pY˜ (y˜)pY (y)
pK2(y | y˜)h2(y)2
{
1− pY˜ ,Y (y˜, y)
pY (y)
}
,
which further implies the convexity of J in the product space of pK2 and h2.
D. Visualization of Algorithm 2
We provide a toy example to visualize Algorithm 2. In the simulation, we choose an alphabet of size
100, and pY˜ as described by r ∈ [0, 1]a is uniform-randomly generated from the probability simplex.
We independently replicate the experiment 50 times, each time running Algorithm 2 for 30 iterations,
and calculate the average of the following results. First, we record ‖P (t+1) − P (t)‖1/a at each iteration
t, which traces the convergence of the estimated transition probabilities. Second, we record the final
transition probability matrix into a heat-map where Py,y˜ means the estimated pK2(y | y˜). The experiments
are performed for β = 100, 10, 1, corresponding to columns 1-3. The plots indicate the convergence of
the algorithm, though the rate of convergence depends on β. They also imply the expected result that a
small β induces an identity transition while a large β induces Y˜ that is nearly independent with Y .
E. Data study: News Text classification
In this experimental study, we use the ‘20-newsgroups’ dataset provided by scikit-learn open-source
library [29], which comprises news texts on various topics. The experiment is intended to illustrate the
utility-privacy tradeoff and the optimality of our proposed solution compared with other methods. For better
visualization we pick up the first four topics (in alphabetic order), which are ‘alt.atheism’, ‘comp.graphics’,
‘comp.os.ms-windows.misc’, ‘comp.sys.ibm.pc.hardware’. Suppose that the service Alice provides is to
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Fig. 3. Visualization of Algorithm 2 in terms of the convergence (row 1) and the final transition probabilities (row 2), for β = 100, 10, 1
(corresponding to three columns).
perform text-based clustering, which takes text data as input and returns one of the four categories (denoted
by 0, 1, 2, 3) as output. The texts are transformed into vectors of numerical values using the technique
of term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) [30]. In the transformation, metadata such as
headers, signature blocks, and quotation blocks are removed. To evaluate the out-sample utility, we split
the data into two parts using the default option provided in [29], which results in a training part (2245
samples, 49914 features) and a testing part (1494 samples, 49914 features). The above split between the
training and testing is based upon messages posted before and after a specific date.
Alice trains a classifier using the Naive Bayes method and records the frequency of observing each
category [0.220.270.210.30] (r in Algorithm 2). Then, Alice runs the OIL-Y Algorithm (under a given
β2) to obtain the transition probability matrix P ∈ [0, 1]4×4. In other words, the effective system provided
by Alice is the cascade of the learned classifier, and P determines the Markov transition. Alice’s resulting
out-sample performance from the testing data is recorded in Figure 4a, where we considered different β’s
summarized in Table I. As we expected, a larger value of β2 cuts off more information propagated from
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Y˜ to Y , resulting in a degraded out-sample performance of Alice’s effective system.
We also visualize the model privacy-utility tradeoff by the following procedure. First, we approximate
the utility that quantifies the useful information conveyed by Alice. With Alice’s trained model and
the optimally laundered Y (from training data), we retrain another Naive Bayes classifier and generate
predictions on the testing data, denoted by ypredK . Meanwhile, we apply Alice’s authentic model to generate
predictions on the testing data, denoted by ypredK∗ . We approximate the model utility as the accuracy measure
between ypredK and y
pred
K∗ . The model utility can be approximated by other measures. We also considered
retraining methods such as tree-based classifiers and average F1-score in computing the model utility,
and the results are consistent in the data experiments. Second, we approximate the privacy leakage as
Alice’s prediction accuracy on the testing data. Intuitively speaking, for a given utility, larger out-sample
prediction accuracy indicates less information laundered, indicating a higher privacy leakage of Alice’s
internal model. We plot the model leakage against utility obtained from our proposed solution in Figure 4b.
For comparison, we considered a benchmark method described below. The conditional probability mass
function pK2(· | y˜) given each y˜ is independently drawn from a Dirichlet distribution with parameters
[b, . . . , b, a, b, . . . , b], where a is the y˜th entry. An interpretation of the parameter is that a larger a/b favors
a larger probability mass at y = y˜ (and thus less noise). We consider different pairs of (a, b) so that the
tradeoff curve matches the counterpart curve from our proposed method. The curve is averaged over 50
independent replications. As shown in Figure 4b, the results indicate that our proposed solution produces
less leakage (and thus better privacy) for a given utility.
We also plot heatmaps illustrating the transition laws pK2(y | y˜) obtained from the proposed information
laundering in Figure 5. We considered two cases, where there are 20% class-0 labels, and where there are
1% class-0 labels (by removing related samples from the original dataset). Intuitively, once we reduce the
size of class-0 data in (b), the transition probabilities pK2(0 | y˜) for each y˜ should be smaller compared
with those in (a) as class-0 is no longer ‘important’. Our expectation is aligned with Figure 5, where the
first row in (b) are indicated by darker colors compared with that in (a), meaning that the class-0 is less
likely to be observed.
F. Data study: Life Expectancy regression
In this experimental study, we use the ‘life expectancy’ dataset provided by kaggle open-source data [31],
originally collected from the World Health Organization (WHO). The data was collected from 193
countries from 2000 to 2015, and Alice’s model is a linear regression that predicts life expectancy using
potential factors such as demographic variables, immunization factors, and mortality rates. This experiment
is intended to illustrate the utility-privacy tradeoff and our proposed solution in regression contexts.
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE TRADEOFF PARAMETERS USED FOR THE OIL-Y ALGORITHM AND RANDOM BENCHMARK FROM DIRICHLET
DISTRIBUTIONS (AVERAGED OVER 50 INDEPENDENT REPLICATIONS), AND THE CORRESPONDING MODEL UTILITY (AS EVALUATED BY
THE CLOSENESS OF ALICE’S AUTHENTIC AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEMS), AS WELL AS THE MODEL PRIVACY LEAKAGE (AS EVALUATED BY
ALICE’S OUT-SAMPLE ACCURACY).
Proposed
β 0 1 2 5 20 50
Utility 1.00 0.86 0.78 0.68 0.46 0.30
Leakage 0.79 0.64 0.53 0.45 $0.35 0.30
Random
Benchmark
a, b 100, 1 20, 1 10, 1 5, 2 5, 3 10, 10
Utility 0.96 0.88 0.79 0.49 0.39 0.23
Leakage 0.77 0.70 0.62 0.40 0.34 0.27
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Fig. 4. Visualization of (a) Alice’s out-sample performance against the tradeoff parameter β2 in Information Laundering, and (b) Alice’s
model utility-privacy tradeoffs under the information laundering technique and the random benchmark using Dirichlet-generated transition
laws. Detailed parameters are summarized in Table I.
In the regression model, we quantize the output alphabet Y by 30 points equally-spaced in between
µ ± 3σ, where µ, σ represent the mean and the standard deviation of Y in the training data. We then
applied a similar procedure as in Subsection F, except that we use the empirical R2 score as the underlying
measure of utility and leakage. The empirical R2 score has been commonly used for evaluating regression
performance, and it can be negative, meaning that the predictive performance is worse than sample
mean-based prediction [32]. In particular, we obtain tradeoff curves in Figure 6, where we compared
the information laundering results based on the proposed technique and Dirichlet-based technique (similar
to that in Subsection F). The different β’s and Dirichlet parameters are summarized in Table II. The
detailed performance values are also summarized in Table II.
To illustrate the impact of tradeoffs, we considered two cases corresponding to β2 = 1 and β2 = 20.
We compute the transition laws pK2(y | y˜) obtained from Algorithm 2 and illustrate them in the first
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Fig. 5. Heatmap showing the transition law pK2(y | y˜) for information laundering, under (a) 20% of class-0 labels, and (b) 1% of class-0
labels. In contrast with the case (a), the class-0 is negligible in (b) and thus the transition probabilities pK2(0 | y˜) for each y˜ becomes
smaller (as indicated by darker colors).
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF THE TRADEOFF PARAMETERS USED FOR THE OIL-Y ALGORITHM AND RANDOM BENCHMARK FROM DIRICHLET
DISTRIBUTIONS (AVERAGED OVER 50 INDEPENDENT REPLICATIONS), AND THE CORRESPONDING MODEL UTILITY (AS EVALUATED BY
THE CLOSENESS OF ALICE’S AUTHENTIC AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEMS), AS WELL AS THE MODEL PRIVACY LEAKAGE (AS EVALUATED BY
ALICE’S OUT-SAMPLE ACCURACY). THE UNDERLYING METRIC USED IS THE EMPIRICAL R2 , WHICH CAN BE LESS THAN ZERO.
Proposed
β 0 1 2 5 8 20
Utility 0.99 0.92 0.84 0.62 0.48 0.35
Leakage 0.79 0.42 0.09 −0.26 −0.45 −0.51
Random
Benchmark
(a, b) 10000, 1 200, 5 100, 5 100, 8 100, 10 100, 20
Utility 0.99 0.77 0.58 0.42 0.36 0.15
Leakage 0.78 0.10 −0.07 −0.15 −0.17 −0.22
row of Figure 5. We also take the snapshot at the year Y˜ = 69 and plot the conditional density function
pK2(· | Y˜ = 69) (as approximated by the quantizers) in the second row of Figure 5. The visualized results
are aligned with our expectation that a larger penalty of model leakage will cause a more dispersed
transition law.
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Fig. 6. Visualization of (a) Alice’s out-sample performance against the tradeoff parameter β2 in Information Laundering, and (b) Alice’s
model utility-privacy tradeoffs under the information laundering technique and the random benchmark using Dirichlet-generated transition
laws. Detailed parameters are summarized in Table II.
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Fig. 7. Heatmap (row 1) showing the transition laws optimized from information laundering, under (a) β2 = 1, and (b) β2 = 20. The
snapshots of probability mass functions of Y conditional on Y˜ = 69 are also visualized (row 2).
